The Japanese were cruel captors. There are Australians that find it hard to forgive and Koreans too. Their fanatical way of fighting and dealing with prisoners was legendary in its cruelty. So I understand the dropping of the bomb.
Different times elicit different responses. Shouldn’t history be viewed through the lens of the time? I certainly heard some interesting retakes on WW1 and 2 history in Europe which had nothing to do with actually happened and the causes of the wars on a recent trip right into Eastern Europe.
Therer are a couple of additional factors - I don't know if they are mentioned in Evan Thomas’s book.
One is cultural. Surrender meant unforgiveable shame to the Japanese. They would rather die fighting even when it was hopeless. The terrifying psychological effect of a new weapon of a power orders of magnitude greater than anything seen before was an important consideration. This effect was greatest on first or second use and diminishes thereafter.
Second, which I think Nigel assumes, is that this was an industrial war, total war. Industry on all sides was almost wholly committed to the war effort. Therefore industrial sites may be classified as military targets. This was a factor that began to emerge in WW1 but was not widely accepted until WW2. Some may disagree citing Dresden. However, if decision makers had to wait until the decision makers had perfect information their losing a war would be guaranteed. Decisions can only be made on the facts known at the time, the balance of probabilities, risks and argument and they must be made at the time demanded by the circumstances and requirements prevailing at the time. Tempo must be maintained.
The Japanese were cruel captors. There are Australians that find it hard to forgive and Koreans too. Their fanatical way of fighting and dealing with prisoners was legendary in its cruelty. So I understand the dropping of the bomb.
Different times elicit different responses. Shouldn’t history be viewed through the lens of the time? I certainly heard some interesting retakes on WW1 and 2 history in Europe which had nothing to do with actually happened and the causes of the wars on a recent trip right into Eastern Europe.
Therer are a couple of additional factors - I don't know if they are mentioned in Evan Thomas’s book.
One is cultural. Surrender meant unforgiveable shame to the Japanese. They would rather die fighting even when it was hopeless. The terrifying psychological effect of a new weapon of a power orders of magnitude greater than anything seen before was an important consideration. This effect was greatest on first or second use and diminishes thereafter.
Second, which I think Nigel assumes, is that this was an industrial war, total war. Industry on all sides was almost wholly committed to the war effort. Therefore industrial sites may be classified as military targets. This was a factor that began to emerge in WW1 but was not widely accepted until WW2. Some may disagree citing Dresden. However, if decision makers had to wait until the decision makers had perfect information their losing a war would be guaranteed. Decisions can only be made on the facts known at the time, the balance of probabilities, risks and argument and they must be made at the time demanded by the circumstances and requirements prevailing at the time. Tempo must be maintained.